Complete Intuitionistic Temporal Logics in Topological Dynamics by Boudou, Joseph et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
00
90
7v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  2
 O
ct 
20
19
Complete Intuitionistic Temporal Logics in
Topological Dynamics
Joseph Boudou ∗1, Martı´n Die´guez †2, and David Ferna´ndez-Duque ‡3
1IRIT, France
2CERV, ENIB,LAB-STICC. Brest, France
3Department of Mathematics, Ghent University. Gent, Belgium
October 3, 2019
Abstract
The language of linear temporal logic can be interpreted over the class of dy-
namic topological systems, giving rise to the intuitionistic temporal logic ITLc♦∀,
recently shown to be decidable by Ferna´ndez-Duque. In this article we axiomatize
this logic, some fragments, and prove completeness for several familiar spaces.
1 Introduction
The dynamic topological logic project originated in the work of Artemov et al. [2],
who suggested that modal logic may be used to reason about dynamic topological sys-
tems (X, f) using the ‘interior’ modality (in the sense of Tarski [34]) and the ‘next’
◦ modality to reason about the action of f . Kremer and Mints [26] later observed
that ‘henceforh’ could be used to model the asymptotic behavior of f , allowing one
to represent phenomena such as the Poincare´ recurrence theorem [31]. The resulting
tri-modal system was called dynamic topological logic (DTL), and it was studied for
some time with expectations that it may be applicable in e.g. automated theorem prov-
ing. However, interest in DTL waned after Konev et al. [24] showed that the validity
problem for DTL formulas is undecidable.
In unpublished work, Kremer [25] also suggested an intuitionistic version of DTL,
based on ‘next’ and ‘henceforth’; no interior modality is required in this setting, as the
topology is reflected in the semantics for implication. Years later, Ferna´ndez-Duque
[19] showed that a mild variant based on ‘next’, ‘eventually’ and a universal modality
was decidable over the class of all dynamical systems, and Boudou et al. [6] showed
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that a logic with ‘next’, ‘eventually’ and ‘henceforth’ was decidable over the class of
all dynamical systems based on a poset (see §3). These results have led us to recast the
dynamic topological logic project in terms of intuitionistic temporal logics.
These decidability results were proven using model-theoretic techniques, with little
being known regarding axiomatic systems. Thus our goal in this paper is to develop
deductive calculi for these logics.
1.1 State-of-the-art
There are several (poly)modal logics which may be used to model time, and some have
already been studied in an intuitionistic setting, e.g. tense logics by Davoren [8] and
propositional dynamic logic with iteration by Nishimura [30]. Here we are specifically
concernedwith intuitionistic analogues of discrete-time linear temporal logic. Versions
of such a logic in finite time have been studied by Kojima and Igarashi [23] and Kamide
and Wansing [22]. Nevertheless, logics over infinite time have proven to be rather
difficult to understand, in no small part due to their similarity to intuitionistic modal
logics such as IS4, whose decidablitiy is still an open problem [32].
Balbiani and the authors have made some advances in this direction, showing that
the intermediate logic of temporal here-and-there is decidable and enjoys a natural
axiomatization [4] and identifying several conservative temporal extensions of intu-
itionistic logic, interpreted over dynamic topological systems [19] or what we call ex-
panding posets [6]. These logics are based on the temporal language with ◦ (‘next’), ♦
(‘eventually’),  (‘henceforth’) and the universal modality ∀. Note that unlike in the
classical case, ♦ and  are not inter-definable [3].
Ferna´ndez-Duque [19] has shown that a formula in the -free language L♦∀ is
valid if and only if it is valid over a class of suitably defined quasimodels. With this
he showed that the validity problem for L♦∀ over the class of dynamical systems is
decidable. It is also shown in [19] that L♦∀ is expressive enough to capture many of
the recurrence phenomena that inspired interest in DTL, such as Poincare´ recurrence
and minimality [5, 13]. As we will show, quasimodels can also be used to prove the
completeness of a natural deductive calculus ITL0♦∀ for this language.
On the other hand, we do not yet have a useful notion of quasimodel in the presence
of , and Kremer [25] has shown that some key axioms of classical LTL (including
ϕ → ◦ϕ) are not valid for his topological semantics. At this point, it is unclear
which weaker principles should replace them. For these reasons, in this manuscript we
restrict our attention to -free fragments of the temporal language.
1.2 Our main result
The main goal of this article is to prove that LTL0♦∀ is complete for the class of dynam-
ical systems (Theorem 8.4). The completeness proof follows the general scheme of
that for linear temporal logic [27]: a set of ‘local states’, which we will call moments,
is defined, where a moment is a representation of a potential point in a model (or, in
our case, a quasimodel). To each moment w one then assigns a characteristic formula
χ(w) in such a way that χ(w) is consistent if and only if w can be included in a model,
from which completeness can readily be deduced.
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In the LTL setting, a moment is simply a maximal consistent subset of a suitable fi-
nite set Σ of formulas. For us a moment is instead a finite labelled tree, and the formula
χ(w) must characterize w up to simulation; for this reason we will henceforth write
Sim(w) instead of χ(w). The required formulas Sim(w) can readily be constructed in
our language (Proposition 6.4).
Note that it is failure of Sim(w) that characterizes the property of simulating w,
hence the possible states will be those momentsw such that Sim(w) is unprovable. The
set of possible moments will form a quasimodel falsifying a given unprovable formula
ϕ (Corollary 8.3), fromwhich it follows that such a ϕ is falsified on somemodel as well
(Theorem 4.8). Thus any unprovable formula is falsifiable, and Theorem 8.4 follows.
Our proof will be presented in such a way that completeness for the sub-logics ITL0◦
(whose only modality is ◦) and ITL0♦ (whith ◦ and ♦) are obtained as partial results.
Once we have established our main completeness theorem, we will consider special
classes of dynamical systems for which our logics are also complete. In summary, we
obtain the following results.
1. ITL0◦ and ITL
0
♦ are sound and complete for the class of expanding posets, for
dynamical systems based on Rn for any fixed n ≥ 2, and for the Cantor space.
2. The logics ITLFS◦ and ITL
FS
◦∀ are sound and complete for the class of persistent
posets.
3. The logic ITL0♦∀ is sound and complete for both the class of all dynamical sys-
tems and of all dynamical systems based on Q.
In contrast, we will also show that ITL0◦ is incomplete for R.
Layout
Section 2 reviews some basic notions regarding partial orders and topology and Sec-
tion 3 introduces the syntax and semantics of ITLc♦. Section 4 then discusses labelled
structures, which generalize both models and quasimodels. Section 5 discusses the
canonical model, which properly speaking is only a deterministic weak quasimodel but
is sufficient to establish completeness results for logics over the language L◦. Sec-
tion 6 reviews simulations and dynamic simulations, including their definability in the
intuitionistic language. Section 7 constructs the initial quasimodel and establishes its
basic properties, but the fact that it is actually a quasimodel is proven only in Section
8 where it is shown that the quasimodel is ω-sensible, i.e. it satisfies the required con-
dition to interpret ♦. The completeness of ITL0♦ follows from this. In Section 9 we
extend our axiomatization for languages with the universal modality and prove that the
logic ITL0♦∀ is complete. In Section 10 we prove via an unwinding construction that
any L♦-formula falsifiable on a quasimodel is also falsifiable on an expanding poset,
from which we conclude that ITL
0
♦ is complete for this class of systems, and in Section
11 show how to adapt results forDTL to our setting, obtaining completeness results for
Q, Rn and the Cantor space. Finally, Section 12 provides some concluding remarks.
3
2 Posets and Topology
We assume familiarity with topological spaces and related concepts; the necessary
background may be found in a text such as [29]. Topological spaces will typically
be denoted X = (|X|, TX), i.e. |X| is the set of points of X and TX the family of open
sets; we will generally adopt the convention of denoting the domain of a stuctureS by
|S|. We denote the interior of A ⊆ |X| by A◦ and its closure by A.
We will also work with posets and it will be convenient to view them as a special
case of topological spaces. As usual, a poset is a pair A = (|A|,4A), where |A| is any
set and 4A ⊆ |A| × |A| is a reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric relation. We write 4
instead of 4A when this does not lead to confusion, and write a ≺ b for a 4 b but
b 64 a. If B ⊆ |A|, A ↾ B is the structure obtained by restricting each component of A
to B, so that A ↾ B = (B,4A ∩ (B ×B)). Similar conventions apply to other classes
of structures, so that for example if X is a topological space and Y ⊆ |X| then X ↾ Y
is Y equipped with the subspace topology.
If W is a poset, consider the topology U4 on |W| given by setting U ⊆ |W| to be
open if and only if, whenever w ∈ U and v < w, we have that v ∈ U . We call U4
the up-set topology of 4. Topological spaces of this form are Aleksandroff spaces [1],
which are fundamental for our completeness proof. IfW,V are preorders then it is not
hard to check that g : |W| → |V| is continuous with respect to the up-set topologies on
W,V if and only if v 4W w implies that g(v) 4V g(w).
3 Syntax and Semantics
Fix a countably infinite set P of propositional variables. The full (intuitionistic tempo-
ral) language L∗ is defined by the grammar (in Backus-Naur form)
ϕ, ψ := ⊥ | p | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ψ | ◦ϕ | ♦ϕ | ϕ | ∀ϕ,
where p ∈ P. Here, ◦ is read as ‘next’, ♦ as ‘eventually’,  as ‘henceforth’ and ∀ as
‘everywhere’; note that this is a universal modality and not a quantifier. We also use
¬ϕ as a shorthand for ϕ→⊥ and ϕ ↔ ψ as a shorthand for (ϕ→ψ) ∧ (ψ→ϕ); we
remark that the exitential modality is definable by ∃ϕ := ¬∀¬ϕ [19]. We denote the
set of subformulas of ϕ ∈ L∗ by sub(ϕ).
The sublanguage of L∗ which only allows modalities inM ⊆ {♦,, ∀} is denoted
LM , where we omit brackets and commaswhen writingM . For purposes of this article,
a temporal language is any language of this form. Note that LM always contains
Booleans, ◦ and implication, even though they will not be listed in M . We write L◦
instead of L∅ (i.e., the language whose only modality is ◦).
Next we define our semantics, based on dynamical systems.
Definition 3.1. A dynamical (topological) system is a triple X = (|X|, TX, fX) where
(|X|, TX) is a topological space and fX : |X| → |X| is a continuous function. A
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valuation on X is a function J·K : L∗ → TX such that
J⊥K = ∅ Jϕ ∧ ψK = JϕK ∩ JψK
Jϕ ∨ ψK = JϕK ∪ JψK Jϕ→ψK = ((|X| \ JϕK) ∪ JψK )◦
J◦ϕK = f−1X JϕK J♦ϕK =
⋃
n<ω f
−n
X JϕK
JϕK = (⋂n<ω f−n JϕK
)◦ J∀ϕK = |X| if JϕK = |X|, ∅ otherwise.
A dynamical system X equipped with a valuation J·KX is a (dynamical topological)
model.
Validity is then defined in the usual way:
Definition 3.2. Given a model X and a formula ϕ ∈ L∗, we say that ϕ is valid on
X, written X |= ϕ, if JϕKX = |X|. If X is a dynamical system, we write X |= ϕ if
(X, J·K) |= ϕ for every valuation J·K on X. If Ω is a class of dynamical systems or
models, we say that ϕ ∈ L∗ is valid on Ω if, for every X ∈ Ω, X |= ϕ. If ϕ is not valid
on Ω, it is falsifiable on Ω.
For a temporal language LM and a class of dynamical systems Ω we define the
logic ITL
Ω
M to be the set of formulas of LM that are valid over Ω.
As before we write ITLΩ◦ instead of ITL
Ω
∅
. Some classes of interest are the class
c of all dynamical systems, the class o of all dynamical systems with a (continuous
and) open map, the class e of all dynamical systems based on a poset (which we call
expanding posets), and the class p = e ∩ o of persistent posets. If X is a topological
space, ITLXM denotes the set of LM -formulas valid on the class of dynamical systems
of the form (X, f).
Example 3.3. Consider the formula ϕ = (¬◦p ∧ ◦¬¬p) → (◦q ∨ ¬◦q). Let us see
that ϕ is valid on R but not over all dynamical systems. Suppose that (R, f, J·K) is a
model based on R and that x ∈ J¬◦p ∧ ◦¬¬pK. From x ∈ J◦¬¬pK and the semantics
of double negation (discussed in [19]) we see that there is a neighbourhood V of f(x)
such that V ⊆ JpK. It follows from the intermediate value theorem that if U is a
neighbourhood of x and f(U) is not a singleton, f(U) ∩ V contains an open set and
hence f(U)∩JpK 6= ∅. Meanwhile, from x ∈ J¬◦pKwe see that x has a neighbourhood
U∗ such that f(U∗) ∩ JpK = ∅, hence for such a U∗ we must have that f(U∗) is the
singleton {f(x)}. But then either f(x) ∈ JqK and x ∈ J◦qK, or else f(x) 6∈ JqK, which
means that U∗ ∩ J◦qK = ∅ and thus U∗ witnesses that x ∈ J¬◦qK. In either case,
x ∈ J◦q ∨ ¬◦qK, as required.
On the other hand, consider the planeR2 with the projection function π(x, y) = x,
and let JpK be the complement of the x axis and JqK the complement of the y axis. It is
not hard to check that 0 6∈ JϕK.
Note that the formula ϕ tells us that ITLR◦ does not enjoy Craig interpolation. The
use ofR2 in this example is not accidental: as we will see, any L♦-formula that is valid
on R2 is valid over the class of all topological spaces. Note that this is no longer the
case for ϕ ∈ L♦∀ [19].
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3.1 Axiomatic systems
Our deductive calculi are obtained from propositional intuitionistic logic [28] by adding
standard axioms and inference rules of LTL [27], although some modifications are
needed to present them in terms of ♦ instead of . For our purposes, a logic is a set
of axioms and rules defining a subset of some temporal language L. We say that Λ′
extendsΛ if the language of Λ′ contains that of Λ andΛ′ is closed under all substitution
instances of the axioms and rules defining Λ.
Let us first give two axiomatizations for L◦. The logic ITL
FS
◦ (for Fischer Servi) is
the least set of L◦-formulas closed under the the axioms of Intuitionistic Propositional
Logic [28] plus the following axioms and inference rules:
(N1) ¬ ◦ ⊥
(N2) ◦ϕ ∧ ◦ψ → ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
(N3) ◦ (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ ◦ϕ ∨ ◦ψ
(N4) ◦ (ϕ→ ψ)→ (◦ϕ→ ◦ψ)
(N5) (◦ϕ→ ◦ψ)→ ◦ (ϕ→ ψ)
(NR1)
ϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
(NR2)
ϕ
◦ϕ
All of the above axioms for ◦ are standard for a functional modality. We also define
the logic ITL0◦ by omitting axiom (N5), which is not valid over the class of dynamical
systems, although it is valid over the class of open systems [7]. In contrast, we can
derive the converses of the other axioms. Below, for a set of formulas Γ we define
◦Γ = {◦ϕ : ϕ ∈ Γ}, and empty conjunctions and disjunctions are defined by
∧
∅ = ⊤
and
∨
∅ = ⊥.
Lemma 3.4. Let L be a temporal language and Λ be a logic over L extending ITL0◦.
Let Γ ⊆ L be finite. Then, the following are derivable in Λ: (1) ◦
∧
Γ ↔
∧
◦Γ
(2) ◦
∨
Γ↔
∨
◦Γ.
Proof. One direction is obtained from repeated use of axioms (N2) or (N3) and the
other is proven using (NR2) and (N4); note that the second claim requires (N1) to treat
the case when Γ = ∅. Details are left to the reader.
Next we define the logic ITL0♦ by extending ITL
0
◦ with the following axioms and
rules.
(E1) ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ (ER1)
ϕ→ ψ
♦ϕ→ ♦ψ
(ER2)
◦ϕ→ ϕ
♦ϕ→ ϕ
Axiom (E1) is the dual of ϕ → ϕ ∧ ◦ϕ. The rule (ER1) replaces the dual K-
axiom (ϕ→ ψ)→ (♦ϕ → ♦ψ) common in intuitionistic modal logic, while (ER2)
is dual to the induction rule ϕ→◦ϕ
ϕ→ϕ
. Of course we could also consider a logic ITL
FS
♦
which includes axiom (N5), but we do not have any completeness results for this logic.
Lemma 3.5. Let L be a temporal language and Λ be a logic over L extending ITL0♦.
Then, for any ϕ ∈ L, Λ ⊢ ♦ϕ→ ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ.
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Proof. Reasoning within ITL0♦, note that ϕ → ♦ϕ holds by (E1) and propositional
reasoning, hence ◦ϕ→ ◦♦ϕ by (NR2), (N4) and (NR1). In a similar way, ◦♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ
holds by (E1) and propositional reasoning, so ◦ ◦♦ϕ→ ◦♦ϕ does by (NR2), (N4) and
(NR1). Hence, ◦ϕ∨◦◦♦ϕ→ ◦♦ϕ holds. Using (N3) and some propositional reasoning
we obtain ◦(ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ) → ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ. But then, by (ER2), ♦(ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ) → ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ;
since ♦ϕ → ♦(ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ) can be proven using (ER1), we obtain ♦ϕ → ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ, as
needed.
Finally, we define the logics ITL0∀ and ITL
0
♦∀ by extending ITL
0 and ITL0♦, respetively,
with the following axioms and rule.
(UA1) ∀ϕ ∨ ¬∀ϕ
(UA2) ∀(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀ϕ→ ∀ψ)
(UA3) ∀(ϕ ∨ ∀ψ)→ ∀ϕ ∨ ∀ψ
(UA4) ∀ϕ→ ϕ
(UA5) ∀ϕ→ ∀∀ϕ
(UA6) ∀ϕ↔ ◦∀ϕ
(UR1)
ϕ
∀ϕ
The reader may observe that these axioms are designed to make the universal
modality behave classically; indeed this is not surprising, as the only truth values that
∀ϕ can take are the whole space or the empty set. With the exception of (N5), we will
assume that all of the above rules and axioms are available when relevant.
Definition 3.6. An admissible intuitionistic temporal logic is any logic Λ over a tem-
poral language LM such that Λ extends ITL
0
M .
As usual, a logic Λ is sound for a class of structures Ω if, whenever Λ ⊢ ϕ, it
follows that Ω |= ϕ. The following is essentially proven in [7]:
Theorem 3.7. ITL
0
♦∀ is sound for the class of dynamical systems.
Note however that a few of the axioms and rules have been modified to fall within
L♦, but these modifications are innocuous and their correctness may be readily checked
by the reader. We will see that every admissible intuitionistic temporal logic is also
complete for the class of dynamic topological systems.
4 Labelled structures
The central ingredient of our completeness proof is given by non-deterministic quasi-
models, introduced by Ferna´ndez-Duque [12] in the context of dynamic topological
logic and later adapted to intuitionistic temporal logic [19].
4.1 Two-sided types
Our presentation will differ slightly from that of [19], since it will be convenient for us
to use two-sided types, defined as follows.
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Definition 4.1. Let Σ ⊆ L♦∀ be closed under subformulas and Φ
+,Φ− ⊆ Σ be finite
sets of formulas. We say that the pair Φ = (Φ+; Φ−) is a two-sided Σ-type if:
1. Φ− ∩ Φ+ = ∅,
2. ⊥ 6∈ Φ+,
3. if ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Φ+, then ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ+,
4. if ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Φ−, then ϕ ∈ Φ− or
ψ ∈ Φ−,
5. if ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ+, then ϕ ∈ Φ+ or
ψ ∈ Φ+,
6. if ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ−, then ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ−,
7. if ϕ → ψ ∈ Φ+, then ϕ ∈ Φ− or
ψ ∈ Φ+,
8. if ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ−, then ψ ∈ Φ−, and
9. if ♦ϕ ∈ Φ− then ϕ ∈ Φ−.
If moreover Σ = Φ− ∪ Φ+, we may say that Φ is saturated. The set of finite
two-sided Σ-types will be denoted TΣ.
Whenever Ξ is an expression denoting a two-sided type, we write Ξ+ and Ξ− to
denote its components. We will consider three partial orders on TΣ. We will write
1) Φ 4T Ψ if Ψ
− ⊆ Φ− and Φ+ ⊆ Ψ+,
2) Φ ⊆T Ψ if Φ
− ⊆ Ψ− and Φ+ ⊆ Ψ+, and
3) Φ ⊑T Ψ if Φ
− = Ψ− and Φ+ ⊆ Ψ+.
Remark 4.2. Ferna´ndez-Duque [19] uses one-sided Σ-types, but it is readily checked
that a one-sided type Φ as defined there can be regarded as a saturated two-sided type
Ψ by setting Ψ+ = Φ and Ψ− = Σ \ Φ. Henceforth we will write type instead of
two-sided type and explicitly write one-sided type when discussing [19].
Many times we want Σ to be finite, and to indicate this, given ∆ ⊆ L∗ we write
Σ ⋐ ∆ if Σ ⊆ ∆ is finite and closed under subformulas. Note that TΣ is partially
ordered by ⊆, and we will endow it with the up-set topology U⊆. For Φ ∈ TΣ, say that
a formula ϕ→ψ ∈ Σ is a defect of Φ if ϕ→ψ ∈ Φ− but ϕ 6∈ Φ+. The set of defects
of Φ will be denoted ∂Φ.
Definition 4.3. Let Σ ⊆ L♦∀ be closed under subformulas. We say that a Σ-labelled
space is a triple W = (|W|, TW, ℓW), where (|W|, TW) is a topological space and
ℓW : |W| → TΣ a continuous function such that for all w ∈ |W|, whenever ϕ→ψ ∈
∂ℓW(w) and U is any neighborhood of w, there is v ∈ U such that ϕ ∈ ℓW(v) and
ψ 6∈ ℓW(v). Such a v revokes ϕ→ψ.
The LM -labelled space W satisfies ϕ ∈ L if ϕ ∈ ℓ
+
W(w) for some w ∈ |W|, and
falsifies ϕ ∈ L if ϕ ∈ ℓ−W(w) for some w ∈ |W|. We say that ℓW is honest if, for every
w ∈ |W| and every ∀ϕ ∈ Σ, we have that ∀ϕ ∈ ℓ+W(w) implies that ϕ ∈ ℓ
+
W(v) for
every v ∈ |W|, and ∀ϕ ∈ ℓ−W(w) implies that ϕ ∈ ℓ
−
W(v) for some v ∈ |W|. We say
thatW and ℓW are saturated if ℓW(w) is saturated for every w ∈ |W|.
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If W is a labelled space, elements of |W| will sometimes be called worlds. As
usual, we may write ℓ instead of ℓW when this does not lead to confusion. Since
we have endowed TΣ with the topology U⊆, the continuity of ℓ means that for every
w ∈ |W|, there is a neighborhoodU ofw such that, whenever v ∈ U , ℓW(w) ⊆ ℓW(v).
Note that not every subsetU of |W| gives rise to a substructure that is also a labelled
space; however, this is the case when U is open. The following is not hard to check.
Lemma 4.4. If Σ ⊆ L♦∀ is closed under subformulas, W is a Σ-labelled space, and
U ⊆ |W| is open, thenW ↾ U is a Σ-labelled space.
For our purposes, a continuous relation on a topological space is a relation under
which the preimage of any open set is open; note that this is not the standard definition
of a contiuous relation. In the context of an Alexandroff space with the up-set topology,
a continuous relation S is one that satisfies the forward confluence property: if w′ <
w S v, then there is v′ such that w′ S v′ < v. Similarly, an open relation S is one such
that if w S v 4 v′, then there is w′ such that w 4 w′ S v′.
Definition 4.5. Let Σ ⊆ L♦∀ be closed under subformulas and Φ,Ψ ∈ TΣ. The
ordered pair (Φ,Ψ) is sensible if
1) ◦ϕ ∈ Φ+ implies ϕ ∈ Ψ+,
2) ◦ϕ ∈ Φ− implies ϕ ∈ Ψ−,
3) ♦ϕ ∈ Φ+ implies
ϕ ∈ Φ+ or ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ+,
4) ♦ϕ ∈ Φ−, implies ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ−,
5) ∀ϕ ∈ Φ+ iff ∀ϕ ∈ Ψ+, and
6) ∀ϕ ∈ Φ− iff ∀ϕ ∈ Ψ−.
Likewise, a pair (w, v) of worlds in a labelled space W is sensible if (ℓ(w), ℓ(v))
is sensible.
A continuous relation S ⊆ |W| × |W| is sensible if every pair in S is sensible.
Further, S is ω-sensible if it is serial and, whenever ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ(w), there are n ≥ 0 and v
such that w Sn v and ϕ ∈ ℓ(v).
A Σ-labelled system is a Σ-labelled space W equipped with a sensible relation
SW ⊆ |W| × |W|; if moreover ℓW is honest and SW is ω-sensible, we say thatW is a
well Σ-labelled system.
Given Σ ⊆ L♦∀ closed under subformulas, any dynamic topological model can
be regarded as a well Σ-labelled system. If X is a model, we can assign a saturated
Σ-type ℓX(x) to x given by ℓX(x) = {ψ ∈ Σ : x ∈ JψKX} .We also set SX = fX; it is
obvious that ℓX is honest and SX is ω-sensible. Henceforth we will tacitly identify X
by its associated well L♦∀-labelled system. However, not all labelled systems we are
interested in arise from models: another useful class of labelled systems is given by
quasimodels.
Definition 4.6. Given Σ ⊆ L♦∀ closed under subformulas, a weak Σ-quasimodel is a
Σ-labelled system Q such that TQ is equal to the up-set topology for a partial order
which we denote4Q. If moreoverQ is a well Σ-labelled system, then we say thatQ is
a Σ-quasimodel.
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Note that quasimodels are very close to models, except that the relation S may
be non-deterministic. Indeed, deterministic quasimodels are essentially models. The
following can be checked by a standard structural induction on ϕ.
Lemma 4.7. Let Σ ⊆ L♦∀ be closed under subformulas and Q be an honest, deter-
ministic Σ-quasimodel.
Define a valuation J·KQ on Q by setting JpKQ = {w ∈ W : p ∈ ℓ(w)+} and
extending to all of L recursively. Then, for all formulas ϕ ∈ L♦ and for all w ∈ W ,
1) if ϕ ∈ ℓ(w)+ then w ∈ JϕKQ, and 2) if ϕ ∈ ℓ(w)− then w 6∈ JϕKQ.
In the non-deterministic case quasimodels are not models as they stand, but in [19],
it is shown that dynamical systems can be extracted from them.
Theorem 4.8 (Ferna´ndez-Duque [19]). A formula ϕ ∈ L♦∀ is satisfiable (falsifiable)
over the class of dynamic topological systems if and only if it is satisfiable (falsifiable)
over the class of saturated, finite, sub(ϕ)-quasimodels.
Note that [19] uses quasimodels with one-sided types, but in view of Remark 4.2,
the theorem can easily be modified to obtain quasimodels with two-sided types. Two-
sided types will be more convenient for us, especially in Section 10. Below, recall that
for a structure A and U ⊆ |A|, A ↾ U is the substructure of A obtained by restricting
all functions and relations of A to U .
Lemma 4.9. LetQ be a (weak) quasimodel and U ⊆ |Q| be open. If either 1) SQ ↾ U
is serial and ω-sensible, or 2) U is SQ-invariant (i.e., SQ(U) ⊆ U ), then Q ↾ U is a
(weak) quasimodel.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 we know that Q ↾ U is a labelled frame, while SQ↾U is clearly
sensible. Since U is open and SQ is continuous, SQ↾U is continuous as well. Thus
it remains to show that SQ↾U is serial and ω-sensible, which in the first case holds by
assumption and in the second follows easily from SQ already having these properties.
As usual, if ϕ is not derivable, we wish to produce a model where ϕ is falsified, but
in view of Theorem 4.8, it suffices to falsify ϕ on a quasimodel. This is convenient, as
quasimodels are much easier to construct than models.
5 The canonical model
In this section we construct a standard canonical model for any logicΛ extending ITL0◦.
From this we will obtain some completeness results for logics over L◦. However, in
the presence of♦, the standard canonical model is only a saturated, weak, deterministic
quasimodel rather than a proper model. Nevertheless, the canonical model will later
be a useful ingredient in our completeness proofs for ITL0♦ and ITL
0
♦∀. Since we are
working over an intuitionistic logic, the role of maximal consistent sets will be played
by prime types, as defined below.
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Definition 5.1. Let L be a temporal language and Λ a logic over L. Given two sets of
formulas Γ and ∆, we say that ∆ is a consequence of Γ (with respect to Λ), denoted
by Γ ⊢ ∆, if there exist finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ and∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that Λ ⊢
∧
Γ′ →
∨
∆′.
We say that a pair of sets Φ = (Φ+,Φ−) is consistent if Φ+ 6⊢ Φ−. A saturated,
consistent L-type is a prime type. The set of prime L-types will be denoted T∞L .
Note that we are using the standard interpretation ofΓ ⊢ ∆ in Gentzen-style calculi.
The logic Λ will always be clear from context, which is why we do not reflect it in the
notation. When working within a turnstyle, we will follow the usual proof-theoretic
conventions of writing Γ,∆ instead of Γ∪∆ and ϕ instead of {ϕ}. Observe that there
is no clash in terminology regarding the use of the word type:
Lemma 5.2. If Λ is an admissible temporal logic over a language L and Φ is a prime
L-type then Φ is an L-type.
Proof. Let Φ be a prime L-type. Observe that Φ is already saturated by definition, so
it remains to check that it satisfies all conditions of Definition 4.1.
Conditions 1 and 2 follow from the consistency of Φ. The proofs of the other
conditions are all similar to each other. For example, for 7, suppose that ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ+
and ϕ 6∈ Φ−. Since Φ is saturated, it follows that ϕ ∈ Φ+. But
(
ϕ ∧ (ϕ → ψ)
)
→ ψ
is an intuitionistic tautology, so using the fact that Φ is consistent we see that ψ 6∈ Ψ−,
which using the assumption that Φ is saturated gives us ψ ∈ Φ+. For condition 9
we use (E1): if ♦ϕ ∈ Φ− and ϕ ∈ Φ+ we would have that Φ is inconsistent, hence
ϕ ∈ Φ−. The rest of the conditions are left to the reader.
As with maximal consistent sets, prime types satisfy a Lindenbaum property.
Lemma 5.3 (Lindenbaum Lemma). Fix an admissible temporal logic Λ over L. Let
Γ,∆ ⊆ L. If Γ 6⊢ ∆ then there exists a prime type Φ such that Γ ⊆ Φ+ and∆ ⊆ Φ−.
Proof. The proof is standard, but we provide a sketch. Let ϕ ∈ L. Note that either
Γ, ϕ 6⊢ ∆ or Γ 6⊢ ∆, ϕ, for otherwise by a cut rule (which is intuitionistically derivable)
we would have Γ ⊢ ∆. Thus we can add ϕ to Γ ∪∆, and by repeating this process for
each element of L♦ (or using Zorn’s lemma) we can find suitable Φ.
Given a set A, let IA denote the identity function on A. Let Λ be an admissi-
ble temporal logic over L. The canonical model MΛ for Λ is defined as the labelled
structure
MΛ = (|MΛ|,4Λ, SΛ, ℓΛ)
def
= (TL,4T , ST , IT∞
L
) ↾ T∞;
in other words, MΛ is the set of prime types with the usual ordering and successor
relations. Note that ℓΛ is just the identity (i.e., ℓΛ(Φ) = Φ). We will usually omit
writing ℓΛ, as it has no effect on its argument.
Next we show thatMΛ is a saturated, weak, deterministic quasimodel. For this, we
must prove that it has all the required properties.
Lemma 5.4. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L. Then,MΛ is a labelled
frame.
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Proof. We know that 4T is a partial order and restrictions of partial orders are partial
orders, so 4Λ is a partial order. Moreover, ℓΛ is the identity, so Φ 4Λ Ψ implies that
ℓΛ(Φ) 4T ℓΛ(Ψ).
Now let Φ ∈ |MΛ| and assume that ϕ → ψ ∈ Φ
−. Note that Φ+, ϕ 6⊢ ψ, for
otherwise by intuitionistic reasoning we would haveΦ+ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, which is impossible
if Φ is a prime type. By Lemma 5.3, there is a prime typeΨ with Φ+ ∪{ϕ} ⊆ Ψ+ and
ψ ∈ Ψ−. It follows that Φ 4Λ Ψ, ϕ ∈ Ψ
+ and ψ ∈ Ψ−, as needed.
Lemma 5.5. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L. Then, SΛ is a continuous
function. If moreover (N5) is an axiom of Λ, then SΛ is also open.
Proof. For a set Γ ⊆ L♦, recall that we have defined ◦Γ = {◦ϕ : ϕ ∈ Γ}. It will be
convenient to introduce the notation ⊖Γ = {ϕ : ◦ϕ ∈ Γ}. With this, we show that SΛ
is functional and forward-confluent.
FUNCTIONALITY. We claim that for all Φ,Ψ ∈ |MΛ|,
Φ SΛ Ψ if and only if Ψ = (⊖Φ
+,⊖Φ−). (1)
We must check that Ψ ∈ |MΛ|. To see that Ψ is saturated, let ϕ ∈ L♦ be so that
ϕ 6∈ Ψ−. It follows that ◦ϕ 6∈ Φ−, but Φ is saturated, so ◦ϕ ∈ Φ+ and thus ϕ ∈ Ψ+.
Since ϕ was arbitrary,Ψ− ∪Ψ+ = L♦.
Next we check that Ψ is consistent. If not, let Γ ⊆ Ψ+ and ∆ ⊆ Ψ− be finite and
such that
∧
Γ→
∨
∆ is derivable. Using (NR2) and (N4) we see that ◦
∧
Γ→ ◦
∨
∆
is derivable, which in view of Lemma 3.4 implies that
∧
◦Γ →
∨
◦∆ is derivable as
well. But ◦Γ ⊆ Φ+ and ◦∆ ⊆ Φ−, contradicting the fact that Φ is consistent.
Thus Ψ ∈ |MΛ|, and Φ SΛ Ψ holds provided that Φ ST Ψ. It is clear that clauses
1) and 2) of Definition 4.5 hold. If ♦ϕ ∈ Φ+ (so that ♦ ∈ M ) and ϕ 6∈ Φ+, it follows
that ϕ ∈ Φ−. By Lemma 3.5 ♦ϕ → ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ is derivable, so we cannot have that
◦♦ϕ ∈ Φ− and hence ◦♦ϕ ∈ Φ+, so that ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ+. Similarly, if ♦ϕ ∈ Φ− we
have that ◦♦ϕ ∈ Φ−, for otherwise we obtain a contradiction from (E1). Therefore,
♦ϕ ∈ Ψ− as well. The clauses for ∀ϕ follow a similar line of reasoning using (UA6).
To check that Ψ is unique, suppose that Θ ∈ |MΛ| is such that Φ SΛ Θ. Then if
ϕ ∈ Ψ+ it follows from (1) that ◦ϕ ∈ Φ+ and hence ϕ ∈ Θ+; by the same argument,
if ϕ ∈ Ψ− it follows that ϕ ∈ Θ−, and henceΘ = Ψ.
CONTINUITY: Now that we have shown that SΛ is a function, we may treat it as such.
Suppose that Φ 4Λ Ψ; we must check that SΛ(Φ) 4Λ SΛ(Ψ). Let ϕ ∈ S
+
Λ (Φ). Using
(1), we have that ◦ϕ ∈ Φ+, hence ◦ϕ ∈ Ψ+ and thus ϕ ∈ SΛ(Ψ
+). Since ϕ ∈ SΛ(Φ)
was arbitrary we obtain S+Λ (Φ) 4Λ S
+
Λ (Ψ), as needed.
OPENNESS: Suppose that Ψ <Λ SΛ(Φ). We claim that Θ
′ := (◦Ψ+ ∪ Φ+, ◦Ψ−)
is consistent. If not, there are finite Ξ ⊆ Ψ+, Γ ⊆ Φ+ and ∆ ⊆ Ψ− such that
⊢
∧
◦Ξ ∧
∧
Γ →
∨
◦∆. Since Γ ⊆ Φ+, this yields
∧
◦Ξ →
∨
◦∆ ∈ Φ+. Using
Lemma 3.4, (N5) and propositional reasoning, this gives us ◦ (
∧
Ξ→
∨
∆) ∈ Φ+,
hence
∧
Ξ →
∨
∆ ∈ Ψ+. But then
∧
Ξ ∧ (
∧
Ξ→
∨
∆) →
∨
∆ would be an
intuitionistic tautology witnessing that Ψ is inconsistent, contrary to our assumption.
We conclude thatΘ′ is consistent, hence it can be extended to a prime typeΘ using the
Lindenbaum lemma, and clearly Φ 4Λ Θ SΛ Ψ, as required.
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E
Figure 1: If E ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a dynamical simulation, this diagram can always be
completed.
Proposition 5.6. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L. Then, the canonical
model for Λ is a deterministic weak quasimodel.
Proof. We need 1. (|MΛ|,4Λ, ℓΛ) to be a labelled frame, 2. SΛ to be a sensible for-
ward-confluent function, and 3. ℓΛ to have TL as its codomain. The first item is Lemma
5.4. That SΛ is a forward-confluent function is Lemma 5.5, and it is sensible since
Φ SΛ Ψ precisely when Φ ST Ψ. Finally, if Φ ∈ |MΛ| then ℓΛ(Φ) = Φ, which is an
element of TL by Lemma 5.2.
From this we may already obtain our first completeness results.
Theorem 5.7. ITL0◦ is complete for the class of expanding posets and ITL
FS
◦ for the
class of persistent posets.
Proof. Let Λ be either ITL0◦ or ITL
FS
◦ . By the Lindenbaum lemma 5.3, if Λ 6⊢ ϕ then
there is Φ ∈ |MΛ| such that ϕ ∈ Φ
−. By Proposition 5.6 MΛ is a deterministic,
weak quasimodel falsifying ϕ, and moreover it is trivially ω-sensible as ♦ is not in our
language. By Lemma 4.7, ϕ is not valid over the class of expanding posets, as required.
In the case that Λ = ITLFS◦ , we additionally use the fact that SΛ is open, so thatMΛ is
persistent.
6 Simulation formulas
Simulations are relations between labelled spaces, and give rise to the appropriate no-
tion of ‘substructure’ for modal and intuitionistic logics. We have used them to prove
that ITLc♦∀ has the finite quasimodel property [19], and they will also be useful for our
completeness proof. Below, recall that Φ ⊆T Ψ means that Φ
− ⊆ Ψ− and Φ+ ⊆ Ψ+.
Definition 6.1. Let Σ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ L♦∀ be closed under subformulas, X be a Σ-labelled
space and Y be ∆-labelled. A continuous relation E ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a simulation if,
whenever x E y, ℓX(x) ⊆T ℓY(y). If there exists a simulation E such that x E y, we
write (X, x)⇀ (Y, y).
The relation E is a dynamic simulation between X andY if SYE ⊆ ESX.
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Next we show that there exist formulas defining points in finite frames up to simu-
lability, i.e. that if W is a finite frame and w ∈ |W|, there exists a formula Sim(w)
such that for all labelled frames M and all x ∈ |M|, M, x |= x if and only if
(W, w) ⇀ (M, x). In contrast, simulability formulas for finite S4 models are not
definable in the classical modal language [14], but they can be constructed using a
polyadic extension of the modal language representing the tangled closure of a family
of sets [15, 20, 21] and expressively equivalent to the µ-calculus over S4 frames [9].
Ferna´ndez-Duque [17] uses simulation formulas to axiomatize the resulting polyadic
extension of DTL; in contrast, the natural axiomatization suggested by Kremer and
Mints [26] of dynamic topological logic is incomplete [18]. In the intuitionistic setting
the situation is simplified somewhat, as finite frames [10] (and hence models) are al-
ready definable up to simulation in the intuitionistic language. This may be surprising,
as the intuitionistic language is less expressive than the modal language; however, intu-
itionistic models are posets rather than arbitrary preorders, and this allows us to define
simulability formulas by recursion on ≺.
Definition 6.2. Fix Σ ⋐ L♦∀ and let W be a finite Σ-labelled frame. Given w ∈ |W|,
we define a formula Sim(w) by backwards induction on 4 = 4W by
Sim(w) =
∧
ℓ+(w)→
∨
ℓ−(w) ∨
∨
v≻w
Sim(v).
Remark 6.3. Observe that if L is a temporal language andW a finiteΣ-labeled frame
with Σ ⋐ L, then Sim(w) ∈ L for all w ∈ |W|.
Proposition 6.4. Given Σ ⋐ ∆ ⊆ L♦∀, a finite Σ-labelled frame W, a ∆-labelled
frame X and w ∈ |W|, x ∈ |X|:
1. if Sim(w) ∈ ℓ−X(x) then there is y < x such that (W, w)⇀ (X, y), and
2. if there is y < x such that (W, w)⇀ (X, y) then Sim(w) 6∈ ℓ+X(x).
Proof. Each claim is proved by backward induction on 4.
(1) Let us first consider the base case, when there is no v ≻ w. Assume that Sim(w) ∈
ℓ−(x). From the definition of labelled frame
∧
ℓ+W(w) ∈ ℓ
+
X(y) and
∨
ℓ−W(w) ∈
ℓ−X(y) for some y < x. From the definition of type it follows that ℓ
+
W(w) ⊆ ℓ
+
X(y)
and ℓ−W(w) ⊆ ℓ
−
X(y), so that ℓW(w) ⊆T ℓX(y). It follows that E
def
= {(w, y)} is a
simulation, so (W, w)⇀ (X, y).
For the inductive step, let us assume that the lemma holds for all v ≻ w. As-
sume that Sim(w) ∈ ℓ−X(x). From the definition of labelled frame, it follows that∧
ℓ+W(w) ∈ ℓ
+
X(y),
∨
ℓ−W(w) ∈ ℓ
−
X(y) and
∨
v≺w Sim(v) ∈ ℓ
−
X(y) for some y < x.
Following similar reasoning as in the base case we can conclude that ℓW(w) ⊆ ℓX(y),
and moreover, that Sim(v) ∈ ℓ−X(y) for all v ≻ w. By induction hypothesis we con-
clude that for all v ≻ w, there exists a simulation Ev such that v Ev zv for some
zv < y. Let E
def
= {(w, y)} ∪
⋃
v≻w
Ev . The reader may check that E is a simulation
and that w E y < x, so that (W, w)⇀ (X, y), as needed.
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(2) For the base case, assume that (W, w) ⇀ (X, y) for some y < x, so there exists
a simulation E such that w E y. It follows that ℓ+W(w) ⊆ ℓ
+
X(y) and ℓ
−
W(w) ⊆
ℓ−X(y). From conditions 3 and 5 of the definition of type (Definition 4.1), it follows that∧
ℓ+W(w) 6∈ ℓ
−
X(y) and
∨
ℓ−W(w) 6∈ ℓ
+
X(y). But then, condition 7 gives us Sim(w) 6∈
ℓ+X(y), so Sim(w) 6∈ ℓ
+
X(x).
For the inductive step, by the same reasoning as in the base case it follows that∧
ℓ+W(w) 6∈ ℓ
−
X(y) and
∨
ℓ−W(w) 6∈ ℓ
+
X(y). Now, let v be such that v ≻ w. Since E is
forward confluent then v E zv for some zv < y. By induction hypothesis, Sim(v) 6∈
ℓ+(zv), so Sim(v) 6∈ ℓ
+(y). Since v was arbitrary we conclude that
∨
v≻w Sim(v) 6∈
ℓ+(y). Finally, from condition 7 of Definition 4.1 and the fact that y 4 x we get that
Sim(w) 6∈ ℓ+(x).
Remark 6.5. Proposition 6.4 more generally holds when X is any labelled space (not
necessarily Aleksandroff), but this restricted version will suffice for our purposes.
7 The initial quasimodel
In this section we review the initial weak quasimodel IΣ [19] and use it to define an
initial quasimodel JΣ. These structures are ‘initial’ in the sense that if A is any labelled
system, there exist surjective simulations from both IΣ and JΣ toA, i.e., they are initial
in a category-theoretic sense.
Theorem 7.1. Given Σ ⋐ L♦∀, there exists a finite, saturated weak quasimodel IΣ
such that if A is any deterministic weak quasimodel then⇀ ⊆ |IΣ|×|A| is a surjective
dynamic simulation.
We do not need to elaborate on the construction of IΣ here, but this is done in
detail in [19]. Points of IΣ are called moments. One can think of IΣ as a finite initial
structure over the category of labelled weak quasimodels. Next, we will internalize the
notion of simulating elements of IΣ into the temporal language. This is achieved by
the formulas Sim(w).
Proposition 7.2. Let Λ be a logic extending ITL0◦ over a temporal language L. Fix
Σ ⋐ L and let I = IΣ, w ∈ |I| and ψ ∈ Σ.
1) If ψ ∈ ℓ−(w), then ⊢ ψ → Sim(w).
2) If ψ ∈ ℓ+(w), then
⊢
(
ψ → Sim(w)
)
→ Sim(w).
3) If w 4 v, then ⊢ Sim(v)→ Sim(w).
4) ⊢
∧
ψ∈ℓ
−
I
(w)
Sim(w)→ ψ.
5) ⊢ ◦
∧
wSIv
Sim(v)→ Sim(w).
Proof. 1) First assume that ψ ∈ ℓ−(w), and toward a contradiction that 0 ψ →
Sim(w). By the Lindenbaum lemma there is Γ ∈ |MΛ| such that ψ → Sim(w) ∈ Γ
−.
Thus for some Θ <Λ Γ we have that ψ ∈ Θ
+ and Sim(w) ∈ Θ−. But then by Propo-
sition 6.4 we have that (W, w) ⇀ (MΛ,∆) for some ∆ <Λ Θ, so that ψ ∈ ∆
−, and
by monotonicity ψ ∈ Θ−, contradicting the consistency of Θ.
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2) If ψ ∈ ℓ+(w), we proceed similarly. Assume toward a contradiction that
0
(
ψ → Sim(w)
)
→ Sim(w). Then, reasoning as above there is Θ ∈ |MΛ| such
that ψ → Sim(w) ∈ Θ+ and Sim(w) ∈ Θ−. From Proposition 6.4 we see that there
is ∆ <c Θ such that (W, w) ⇀ (MΛ,∆), so that ψ ∈ ∆
+ and, once again by Propo-
sition 6.4, Sim(w) ∈ ∆−. It follows that ψ → Sim(w) 6∈ ∆+; but in view of upward
persistence, this contradicts that ψ → Sim(w) ∈ Θ+.
3) Suppose that v < w. Reasoning as above, it suffices to show that if Γ ∈ |MΛ|
is such that Sim(w) ∈ Γ−, then also Sim(v) ∈ Γ−. But if Sim(w) ∈ Γ−, there is
Θ <Λ Γ such that (I, w) ⇀ (MΛ,Θ). By forward confluence (I, v) ⇀ (MΛ,∆) for
some ∆ <Λ Θ. Thus by Proposition 6.4, Sim(v) ∈ ∆
− and by upwards persistence
Sim(v) ∈ Γ−. Since Γ ∈ |MΛ| was arbitrary, the claim follows.
4) We prove that if Γ ∈ |MΛ| is such that
∧
ψ∈ℓ−(w)
Sim(w) ∈ Γ+, (2)
then ψ ∈ Γ+. If (2) holds then by Theorem 7.1, there is w ∈ |I| with (I, w) ⇀
(MΛ,Γ). By Proposition 6.4, Sim(w) ∈ Γ
−, hence it follows from (2) thatψ 6∈ ℓ−(w);
but I is saturated and ψ ∈ Σ, so ψ ∈ ℓ+(w) and thus ψ ∈ Γ+, as required.
5) Suppose that Γ ∈ |MΛ| is such that
◦
∧
wSIv
Sim(v) ∈ Γ+, (3)
and assume toward a contradiction that Sim(w) ∈ Γ−. By Proposition 6.4 (I, w) ⇀
(MΛ,∆) for some ∆ <Λ Γ. Since⇀ is a dynamic simulation, it follows that there is
v ∈ |I| with w SI v and (I, v) ⇀
(
MΛ, SΛ(∆)
)
, so that Sim(v) ∈
(
SΛ(∆)
)−
. It
follows that ◦Sim(v) ∈ Γ−, since SΛ is sensible and Γ is saturated. But ∆ <Λ Γ, so
that ◦Sim(v) ∈ S−Λ (Γ) as well, contradicting (3).
We are now ready to define our initial quasimodel. Given a finite set Σ of formulas,
we will define a quasimodel JΣ falsifying all unprovable Σ-types. This quasimodel
is a substructure of IΣ, containing only moments which are possible in the following
sense.
Definition 7.3. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L ⊆ L♦∀. Fix Σ ⋐ L. We
say that a moment w ∈ |IΣ| is possible if 6⊢ Sim(w), and denote the set of possible
Σ-moments by JΣ.
The following gives an alternative characterization of Definition 7.3 and can be
checked using Proposition 6.4 and the Lindenbaum lemma.
Lemma 7.4. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L ⊆ L♦∀ and Σ ⋐ L. Then,
w ∈ |IΣ| is possible if and only if there is Γ ∈ |MΛ| such that (IΣ, w)⇀ (MΛ,Γ).
With this we are ready to define our initial structure, which as we will see later is
indeed a quasimodel.
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Definition 7.5. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L ⊆ L♦∀. Given Σ ⋐ L,
we define the initial structure for Σ by JΣ = IΣ ↾ JΣ.
Remark 7.6. In principle JΣ depends on Λ, but we do not reflect this in the notation
since Λ will always be either ITL0♦ or ITL
0
♦∀, depending on whether ∀ appears in Σ.
Our strategy from here on will be to show that canonical structures are indeed
quasimodels; once we establish this, completeness of ITL0♦ is an easy consequence.
The most involved step will be showing that the successor relation on JΣ is ω-sensible,
but we begin with some simpler properties.
Lemma 7.7. Let Λ be a logic extending ITL0◦ over a temporal languageL ⊆ L♦∀. Let
Σ ⋐ L, I = IΣ and J = JΣ. Then, |J| is an open subset of |I| and SJ is serial.
Proof. To check that |J| is upward closed, let w ∈ |J| and suppose v < w. Now,
by Proposition 7.2.3), we have that ⊢ Sim(v) → Sim(w); hence if w is possible, so
is v. To see that SJ is serial, observe that by Proposition 7.2.5), if w ∈ |J| ⊆ |I|,
⊢ ◦
∧
wSIv
Sim(v) → Sim(w). Since w is possible, it follows that for some v with
w SI v, v is possible as well, for otherwise ◦
∧
wSIv
Sim(v) would be equivalent to
◦⊤, allowing us to deduce Sim(w). But then v ∈ |J|, as needed.
8 ω-Sensibility
In this section we will show that SJ is ω-sensible, the most difficult step in proving that
J = JΣ is a quasimodel. Fix an admissible temporal logic Λ over L ⊆ L♦∀, and let R
denote the transitive, reflexive closure of SJ . If w R v, we say that v is reachable from
w.
Lemma 8.1. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L ⊆ L♦∀. If Σ ⋐ L and
w ∈ |JΣ|, then ⊢ ◦
∧
wRv
Sim(v)→
∧
wRv
Sim(v).
Proof. Let I = IΣ. By Proposition 7.2.5) we have that, for all v ∈ R(w),
⊢ ◦
∧
vSIu
Sim(u)→ Sim(v).
Now, if u 6∈ |JΣ|, then ⊢ Sim(u), hence by (NR2) we have ⊢ ◦Sim(u), and we can
remove Sim(u) from the conjunction using Lemma 3.4 and propositional reasoning.
Since v ∈ R(w) was arbitrary, this shows that
⊢ ◦
∧
wRv
Sim(v)→
∧
wRv
Sim(v).
From this we obtain the following, which evidently implies ω-sensibility:
Proposition 8.2. Let Λ be a logic extending ITL0♦ over a temporal languageL ⊆ L♦∀
andΣ ⋐ L. Ifw ∈ |JΣ| and♦ψ ∈ ℓ
+(w), then there is v ∈ R(w) such thatψ ∈ ℓ+(v).
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Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume that w ∈ JΣ and ♦ψ ∈ ℓ
+(w) but, for all
v ∈ R(w), ψ ∈ ℓ−(w). By Lemma 8.1, ⊢ ◦
∧
wRv
Sim(v) →
∧
wRv
Sim(v). By the
♦-induction rule (ER2), ⊢ ♦
∧
wRv
Sim(v)→
∧
wRv
Sim(v); in particular,
⊢ ♦
∧
wRv
Sim(v)→ Sim(w). (4)
Now let v ∈ R(w). By Proposition 7.2.1) and the assumption that ψ ∈ ℓ−(v) we
have that ⊢ ψ → Sim(v), and since v was arbitrary, ⊢ ψ →
∧
wRv Sim(v). Using
distributivity (ER1) we further have that ⊢ ♦ψ → ♦
∧
wRv Sim(v). This, along with
(4), shows that ⊢ ♦ψ → Sim(w); however, by Proposition 7.2.2) and our assumption
that ♦ψ ∈ ℓ+(w) we have that ⊢
(
♦ψ → Sim(w)
)
→ Sim(w), hence by modus
ponens we obtain ⊢ Sim(w), which contradicts the assumption that w ∈ JΣ. We
conclude that there can be no such w.
Corollary 8.3. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L ⊆ L♦∀. Then, if Σ ⋐ L,
JΣ is a quasimodel.
Proof. Let J = JΣ. By Lemma 7.7, |J| is upwards closed in |IΣ| and SJ is serial,
while by Proposition 8.2, SJ is ω-sensible. It follows from Lemma 4.9 that J is a
quasimodel.
We are now ready to prove that ITL0♦ is complete.
Theorem 8.4. If ϕ ∈ L♦ is valid over the class of dynamical systems, ITL
0
♦ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose ϕ is an unprovable formula and let
W =
{
w ∈ Isub(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ ℓ
−(w)
}
.
Then, by Proposition 7.2.4) we have that ⊢
∧
w∈W Sim(w) → ϕ; since ϕ is unprov-
able, it follows that some w∗ ∈ W is possible and hence w∗ ∈ Jsub(ϕ). By Corollary
8.3, Jsub(ϕ) is a quasimodel, so that by Theorem 4.8, ϕ is falsifiable in some dynamical
system.
9 The universal modality
Now let us show that ITL0♦∀ is complete for the class of dynamical systems. As before
our completeness proof relies on the canonical model MITL0
♦∀
and the initial quasi-
model JΣ (for suitable Σ), but now we cannot use these structures as they are as they
are not honest (see Definition 4.3). We will first exhibit an honest substructure of
MITL0
♦∀
.
Definition 9.1. Let Σ ⊆ L♦∀. We define Σ∀ to be the set of formulas of Σ of the form
∀ϕ. A universal Σ-profile is a partition Π = (Π+,Π−) of Σ∀. If Φ = (Φ
+,Φ−) is a
pair of sets of formulas, we define Φ∀ =
(
(Φ+)∀, (Φ
−)∀
)
, which we will henceforth
write as (Φ+∀ ,Φ
−
∀ ).
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Definition 9.2. Given Σ ⊆ L♦∀, a Σ-labelled structure A and a universalΣ-profileΠ,
we define A[Π] = A ↾ {w ∈ |A| : Π ⊆T ℓ∀(w)}.
Lemma 9.3. Let Σ ⋐ L♦∀, Λ = ITL
0
♦∀, MΛ be the canonical Λ-model and Π a
universal Σ–profile. Then, |MΛ[Π]| is open and MΛ[Π] is honest as a Σ-labelled
quasimodel.
Proof. It can be checked using universal excluded middle (UA1) that |MΛ[Π]| is open
and using (UA6) that it is SΛ-invariant. In view of Lemma 10.9, we may moreover
conclude thatMΛ[Π] is a weak quasimodel.
It remains to show thatMΛ[Π] is honest. That ∀ϕ ∈ Φ
+ ∩ Σ implies that ϕ ∈ Ψ+
for all Φ,Ψ ∈ |MΛ[Π]| follows readily from the truth axiom (UA4). For the remaining
condition, let us take Φ ∈ |MΛ[Π]| and let ∀ϕ ∈ Σ be such that ∀ϕ ∈ Φ
−. Let Ψ′ =
(Π+, {ϕ} ∪ Π−). Assume towards a contradiction that Ψ′ is not consistent, so that ⊢∧
Π+ → ϕ ∨
∨
Π−. By Rule (UR1), ⊢ ∀ (
∧
Π+ → ϕ ∨
∨
Π−). By Axiom (UA2), ⊢
∀
∧
Π+ → ∀ (ϕ ∨
∨
Π−). From Φ∀ = Π and axioms (UA5), (UA2) and propositional
reasoning we conclude that ⊢
∧
Π+ → ∀
∧
Π+, hence ⊢
∧
Π+ → ∀ (ϕ ∨
∨
Π−).
By several applications of Axiom (UA3), ⊢ ∀ (ϕ ∨
∨
Π−) → ∀ϕ ∨
∨
Π−, hence
⊢
∧
Π+ → ∀ϕ ∨
∨
Π−, which since ∀ϕ ∈ Π− ⊆ Φ− implies that Φ is inconsistent, a
condtradiction.
Hence Ψ′ is consistent. By Lemma 5.3, Ψ′ can be extended to a prime type Ψ.
Since, by construction, Π ⊆T Ψ, we have that Ψ ∈ |MΛ[Π]| and, moreover, ϕ ∈ Ψ
−,
as required.
This already is sufficient to prove that our logics over L◦∀ are complete. The proof
of the following is analogous to that of Theorem 5.7, but using the structures MΛ[Π]
instead ofMΛ.
Theorem 9.4. ITL
0
◦∀ is complete for the class of expanding posets and ITL
FS
◦∀ for the
class of persistent posets.
Remark 9.5. We will not go into detail regarding strong completeness in this article,
but Theorems 5.7 and 9.4 can be strengthened to state that these logics are strongly
complete. Note that logics with ♦ cannot be strongly complete since they are not com-
pact.
For the language with ♦ we will use an honest substructure of IΣ, for which we
use the following result of [19].
Lemma 9.6. Suppose that Σ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ L♦∀ are both closed under subformulas, X is
a Σ-labelled space, Y is a ∆-labelled space, and χ ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a total, surjective
simulation. Then, if ℓY is honest, it follows that ℓX is honest as well.
Finally, we observe that |JΣ[Π]| is a quasimodel.
Lemma 9.7. If Σ ⋐ L♦∀ and Π is a Σ-universal profile then⇀ ∩ |JΣ[Π]| × |MΛ[Π]|
is total and surjective and JΣ[Π] is a quasimodel.
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Proof. Let J = JΣ. If w ∈ |J[Π]|, by Lemma 7.4 there is Γ ∈ |MΛ| with (J, w) ⇀
(MΛ,Γ), and by label-preservation Π ⊆T Γ, so that Γ ∈ |MΛ[Π]|. Hence ⇀ is
total. Conversely, if Γ ∈ |MΛ[Π]| then by Theorem 7.1 there is w ∈ |J[Π]| such that
(J, w)⇀ (MΛ,Γ), and once again by label-preservationw ∈ |J[Π]|.
To see that J[Π] is a quasimodel, in view of Lemma 4.9, it suffices to show that
|J[Π]| is open and SJ -invariant. However, if w ∈ |J[Π]|, then since ⇀ is total we
have that there is Γ ∈ |MΛ[Π]| with (J, w) ⇀ (MΛ,Γ). By Lemma 9.3 |MΛ[Π]| is
open, hence by continuity v ∈ ⇀−1(|MΛ[Π]|), and once again by label-preservation
this shows thatΠ ⊆T ℓ(v), so that v ∈ |J[Π]|. That |J[Π]| is SJ-invariant is immediate
from conditions 5) and 6) of Definition 4.5 and the fact that SJ is sensible.
Theorem 9.8. The logic ITL
0
♦∀ is complete for the class of dynamical systems.
Proof. If ϕ is unprovable, then ϕ ∈ Φ− for some Φ ∈ |MΛ|, and by Theorem 7.1,
there is some w ∈ |JΣ| such that (JΣ, w) ⇀ (MΛ,Φ). Let Π = (ℓ(w))∀. Then,
MΛ[Π] is an honest weak quasimodel, so that by Lemmas 9.6 and 9.7, so is JΣ[Π]. It
follows by Theorem 4.8 that ϕ is falsifiable on some dynamic topological model.
10 Completeness for expanding posets
Our goal for this section is to show that the temporal logics of dynamic posets and of
dynamical systems coincide with respect to L♦. We will show this by ‘unwinding’ a
quasimodel to produce a dynamical poset. First we discuss some operations on types
that will be used in the unwinding. If Σ is a set of formulas, first define Ψ/Σ = (Ψ+ ∩
Σ,Ψ−), and sub(Σ) =
⋃
ϕ∈Σ sub(ϕ). With this, we have the following:
Lemma 10.1. Let Φ,Ψ,Γ,Θ be L♦-types and Σ ⊆ L♦ closed under subformulas.
Then,
1. Φ/Σ is also a type;
2. if Γ ⊑T Φ 4T Ψ or Γ 4T Φ ⊑T Ψ then Γ 4T Ψ, and
3. if Γ ⊑T Φ ST Ψ and sub(Γ
+) ⊆ Σ, then Γ ST Ψ/Σ.
Proof. To prove item 1 it is sufficient to check that the conditions of Definition 4.1
hold. Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 4.1 are straightforward. Since Φ− = (Φ/Σ)−,
conditions 4 and 6 clearly hold. For condition 7, suppose that ϕ→ ψ ∈ (Ψ/Σ)+. Since
Σ is closed under subformulas, ϕ, ψ ∈ Σ and, since Ψ is a type it follows that either
ϕ ∈ Ψ− or ψ ∈ Ψ+. By definition either ϕ ∈ Ψ− or ψ ∈ Ψ+ ∩ Σ. The proofs for
conditions 3 and 5 of Definition 4.1 are similar and left to the reader.
Regarding item 2 of the lemma, on one side, Γ ⊑T Φ 4T Ψ means that Γ
+ ⊆
Φ+ ⊆ Ψ+ and Γ− = Φ− ⊇ Ψ−. Therefore Γ+ ⊆ Ψ+ and Ψ− ⊆ Γ− so Γ 4T Ψ.
On the other side Γ 4T Φ ⊑T Ψ means by definition that Γ
+ ⊆ Ψ+ ⊆ Ψ+ and
Γ− ⊇ Φ− = Ψ−. It follows that Γ+ ⊆ Ψ+ and Ψ+ ⊆ Γ− so Γ 4T Ψ.
For item 3 we must check that each condition of Definition 4.5 holds. As an ex-
ample, we work out 3). If ♦ψ ∈ Γ+, since sub(Γ+) ⊆ Σ then ♦ψ, ψ ∈ Σ. From
Γ ⊑T Φ ST Ψ we conclude that ♦ψ ∈ Φ
+ and either ψ ∈ Γ+ or ♦ψ ∈ Ψ+. From
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this it follows that either ψ ∈ Γ+ or ♦ψ ∈ Ψ+ ∩ Σ (which means that ♦ψ ∈ (Ψ/Σ)
+
).
Other conditions follow similar reasoning and are left to the reader.
We may also wish to ‘forget’ temporal formulas that have been realized. To make
this precise, let sup(ϕ) denote the set of super-formulas of ϕ, i.e., sup(ϕ) = {ψ ∈
L♦ : ϕ ∈ sub(ψ)}. Say that a formula ϕ is a temporal formula if it is of the forms ◦ψ
or ♦ψ, and if Φ is a set of formulas, say that ϕ ∈ Φ is maximal in Φ if it does not have
any temporal superformulas in Φ (exceptϕ). Then, defineΦ\ϕ = (Φ+ \sup(ϕ),Φ−).
Lemma 10.2. Suppose that Φ ST Ψ. 1) If ◦ϕ is maximal in Φ
+, then Φ ST (Ψ \ ◦ϕ)
. 2) If ♦ϕ is maximal in Φ+ and ϕ ∈ Φ+, then Φ ST (Ψ \ ♦ϕ).
Proof sketch. We consider the first item; the second is analogous. Assuming that ◦ϕ
is maximal in Φ+, it must be checked that the four conditions of Definition 4.5 hold.
For conditions (1)) and (3)), remark that sup(◦ϕ)∩Φ+ = {◦ϕ}. Therefore if ◦θ or ♦θ
belong to Φ+, then neither θ nor ♦θ belong to sup(◦ϕ). For conditions (2)) and (4)), it
suffices to observe that (Ψ \ ◦ϕ)− = Ψ−.
The unwinding procedure is similar to that in [19]. There, the points of the ‘limit
model’ obtained from a quasimodel are the infinite paths satisfying all ♦-formulas in
their labels. However, to obtain a poset rather than a topological space, we will instead
work with finite paths.
Definition 10.3. IfQ is an L♦-quasimodel, a path (onQ) is a sequence (wi)i<n ⊆ |Q|
such that wi S wi+1 for all i < n− 1. We define a typed path (onQ) to be a sequence
((wi,Φi))i<n such that (wi)i<n is a path, for all i < n, Φi ⊑T ℓ(wi), and for all
i < n− 1, Φi ST Φi+1.
We say that ((wi,Φi))i<n is properly typed if sub(Φ
+
i+1) ⊆ sub(Φ
+
i ) for all i <
n− 1, and terminal if Φ+n−1 = ∅.
Note that we allow Φi ⊑T ℓ(wi) and not only Φi = ℓ(wi). This will allow us to
use finite paths, as temporal formulas can be ‘forgotten’ once they have been realized.
Definition 10.4. We define the weak limit model Q̂ of Q as follows:
• Define |Q̂| to be the set of terminal typed paths on Q together with the empty
path, which we denote ǫ.
• For α = ((wi,Φi))i<n, β = ((vi,Ψi))i<m ∈ |Q̂|, define α 4Q̂ β if n ≤ m and
for all i < n, wi 4 vi and Φi 4T Ψi.
• Define S
Q̂
(((wi,Φi))i<n) = ((wi+1,Φi+1))i<n−1; note that SQ̂(ǫ) = ǫ.
• If n > 0, define ℓ
Q̂
(((wi,Φi))i<n) = Φ0. Then, set ℓQ̂(ǫ)
− =
⋃
w∈W ℓ(w)
−
and ℓ
Q̂
(ǫ)+ = ∅.
The structure Q̂ we have just defined is always a deterministic quasimodel, as we
show in the following lemmas.
Lemma 10.5. If Q is an L♦-quasimodel then Q̂ is a dynamic poset.
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Proof. We have to prove that 4
Q̂
is a partial order on |Q̂|, S
Q̂
is a function and that
it is continuous. We prove only continuity and leave the other properties to the reader.
Let α = ((wi,Φi))i<n and β = ((vi,Ψi))i<m. If α 4Q̂ β then n ≤ m and for all
i < n, wi 4 v1 and Φi 4T Ψi. If n > 0, then we also have n− 1 ≤ m− 1 and for all
i < n− 1, wi+1 4 vi+1 and Φi+1 4T Ψi+1, i.e., SQ̂(α) = ((wi+1,Φi+1))i<n−1 4Q̂
((vi+1,Ψi+1))i<m−1 = SQ̂(β), as needed. If n = 0 then α = ǫ, so that SQ̂(α) = ǫ
and clearly ǫ 4
Q̂
S(β).
Next, we must show that Q̂ has ‘enough’ paths. First we show that we can iterate
the forward-confluence property.
Lemma 10.6. If Q is an L♦-quasimodel, ((wi,Φi))i<n is a typed path in Q, and
w0 4 v0, then there is a typed path ((vi,Ψi))i<n such that wi 4 vi and Φi 4T Ψi for
all i < n.
Proof. First we find vi by induction on i; v0 is already given, and once we have found
vi, we use forward confluence to choose vi+1 so that vi S vi+1 and wi+1 4 vi+1.
Then we set Ψi = ℓ(vi); since S is sensible, Ψi ST Ψi+1, and by Lemma 10.1.2,
Φn 4T Ψn.
Now we want to prove that any point can be included in a terminal typed path. For
this we will first show that we can work mostly with properly typed paths, thanks to
the following.
Lemma 10.7. LetQ be anL♦-quasimodel, (wi)i<n be a path on |Q|, andΦ0 ⊑ ℓ(w0).
Then there exist (Φi)i<n such that ((wi,Φi))i<n is a properly typed path.
Proof. For i < n − 1 define recursively Φi+1 = ℓ(wi+1)/sub(Φ+i ); by the assumption
that S is sensible and Lemma 10.1, Φi ST Φi+1 for each i < n − 1. It is easy to see
that ((wi,Φi))i<n thus defined is properly typed.
However, the properly typed paths we have constructed need not be terminal. This
will typically require extending them to a long-enough path. The extension procedure
is precisely the crux of our unwinding procedure.
Lemma 10.8. If Q is an L♦-quasimodel, then any non-empty typed path onQ can be
extended to a terminal path.
Proof. Let α = ((wi,Φi))i<m be any typed path on Q. For a type Φ, define ‖Φ‖ =
|sub(Φ+)|. We proceed to prove the claim by induction on ‖Φm−1‖. Consider first
the case where Φ+m−1 contains no temporal formulas; that is, formulas of the form
◦ψ or ♦ψ for some ψ. In this case, using the seriality of S choose wm such that
wm−1 S wm, and define Φm+1 = (ℓ(wm)
−;∅); it is easy to see that ((wi,Φi))i≤m
is a terminal path. Otherwise, let ϕ be a maximal temporal formula of Φ+m−1, i.e., it
does not appear as a proper subformula of any other temporal formula in Φ+m−1. We
consider two sub-cases.
Assume first that ϕ = ◦ψ. Then, by the seriality of S, we may choose wm so that
wm−1 S wm. Applying Lemma 10.7, let Φ˜m be such that ((wm−1,Φm−1), (wm, Φ˜m))
is a properly typed path. Setting Φm = Φ˜m \ ◦ψ, we see by Lemma 10.2.1) that
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((wm−1,Φm−1), (wm,Φm)) is a properly typed path, and ‖Φm‖ < ‖Φm−1‖, since
the left-hand side does not count ◦ψ. Thus we may apply the induction hypothesis to
obtain a terminal typed path ((wi,Φi))i<n extending α.
Now consider the case where ϕ = ♦ψ. Since S is ω-sensible, there is a path
wm−1 S wm S . . . S wk so that ϕ ∈ ℓ(wk). Using the seriality of S, choose
wk+1 so that wk S wk+1. By Lemma 10.7, there are types Φi for m ≤ i ≤ k
and a type Φ˜k+1 such that ((wm−1,Φm−1), . . . , (wk,Φk), (wk+1, Φ˜k+1)) is a prop-
erly typed path. Then, define Φk+1 = Φ˜k+1 \ ♦ψ. Using Lemma 10.2 we see that
(Φk,Φk+1) is sensible; moreover, ‖Φk+1‖ < ‖Φm−1‖. Hence we can apply the in-
duction hypothesis to obtain a terminal typed path ((wi,Φi))i<n extending α.
With this, we are ready to show that our unwinding is indeed a deterministic quasi-
model.
Lemma 10.9. If Q is an L♦-quasimodel, then Q̂ is a deterministic L♦-quasimodel.
Proof. We have already seen in Lemma 10.5 that (|Q̂|,4
Q̂
, S
Q̂
) is a dynamic poset,
so it remains to check that (|Q̂|,4
Q̂
, ℓ
Q̂
) is a labelled frame and S
Q̂
is sensible and
ω-sensible. Let α =
(
(wi,Φi)
)
i<n
∈ |Q̂|.
First we must check that if α 4
Q̂
β, then ℓ
Q̂
(α) 4T ℓQ̂(β). Consider two cases;
if n > 0, then β is also of the form (vi,Ψi)i<m with m > 0 and by definition,
ℓ
Q̂
(α) = Φ0 4T Ψ0 = ℓQ̂(β). Otherwise, α = ǫ, and it is clear from the definition of
ℓ
Q̂
(ǫ) that ℓ
Q̂
(ǫ) 4T ℓQ̂(β) regardless of β.
Now assume that ϕ→ ψ ∈ ℓ
Q̂
(α)−. If n > 0, then sinceQ is a labelled frame, we
can pick v0 < w0 with ϕ ∈ ℓ(v0)
+ and ψ ∈ ℓ(v0)
−. Since Φ0 ⊑T ℓ(w0) 4T ℓ(v0),
by Lemma 10.1.2, Φ0 4T ℓ(v0), so that by Lemma 10.6, there is a typed path β
′ =
((vi,Ψi))i<n with Ψ0 = ℓ(v0) such that wi 4 vi and Φi 4T Ψi for all i < n. By
Lemma 10.8, we can extend β′ to a terminal path β. Then, it is easy to see that α 4̂ β,
ϕ ∈ ℓ
Q̂
(β)+, and ψ ∈ ℓ
Q̂
(β)−, as required.
To check that S
Q̂
is sensible, consider two cases. If S
Q̂
(α) 6= ǫ, then α has length at
least two, but since α is a typed path, ℓ
Q̂
(α) = Φ0 ST Φ1 = ℓQ̂
(
S
Q̂
(α)
)
. Otherwise,
S
Q̂
(α) = ǫ; this means that either α = ǫ and thus ℓ+
Q̂
(α) = ∅, or α has length 1, in
which case since α is terminal, so we also have that ℓ+
Q̂
(α) = ∅. In either case, there
can be no temporal formula in ℓ+
Q̂
(α). Now, if ◦ϕ ∈ ℓ−
Q̂
(α), then ◦ϕ ∈ ℓ−(w) for some
w ∈ W , hence ϕ ∈ ℓ−S(v) for any v with w S v (which exists since S is serial), and
thus ϕ ∈ ℓ
Q̂
(ǫ)−. Similarly, if ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ−
Q̂
(α), then by Definition 4.1.9 ϕ ∈ ℓ−(α), so
that ϕ ∈ ℓ−
Q̂
(ǫ).
Finally we check that S
Q̂
is ω-sensible. Suppose that ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ(α)+. This means
that α 6= ǫ, so n > 0, and since α is terminal, ♦α 6∈ Φn−1. But this is only possible if
ϕ ∈ Φi for some i < n− 1, in which case ϕ ∈ ℓQ̂
(
Si
Q̂
(α)
)
.
Theorem 10.10. A formula ϕ ∈ L♦ is satisfiable (falsifiable) over the class of dynamic
posets if and only if it is satisfiable (falsifiable) over the class of dynamical systems.
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Proof. Suppose that ϕ ∈ L♦ is satisfied (falsified) on a dynamical topological model.
Then, by Theorem4.8,ϕ is satisfied (falsified) on some pointw∗ of a sub(ϕ)-quasimodel
Q. By Lemma 10.9, Q̂ is a deterministic quasimodel, and by Lemma 10.8, (w∗, ℓ(w∗))
can be extended to a terminal path α∗ ∈ |Q̂|. By Lemma 4.7, α∗ satisfies (falsifies) ϕ
on the dynamic poset model (|Q̂|,4
Q̂
, S
Q̂
, J·K
Q̂
).
As an immediate consequence of Theorems 8.4 and 10.10, we conclude that ITL0♦
is complete for the class of expanding posets.
Corollary 10.11. ITL0♦ = ITL
c
♦ = ITL
e
♦.
11 Completeness for specific spaces
In this section we will show that the above completeness theorems already hold for
some familiar spaces, which follows from known results regarding dynamic topological
logic. Thus it will be convenient to briefly review DTL and how ITL embeds into
it. Since the base logic of DTL is classical, we may use a simpler syntax, using the
language LC given by the grammar
⊥ | p | ϕ→ ψ | ϕ | ◦ϕ | ϕ | ∀ϕ.
We can then define ¬,∧,∨,,♦ using standard classical validities, and denote the ∀-
free sublanguage by LC.
Given a dynamical system X, a classical valuation on X is a function J·KC : LC →
P(|X|) such that
J⊥KC = ∅ Jϕ→ ψKC = (|X| \ JϕKC) ∪ JψKC
JϕKC = (JϕKC)◦ J◦ϕKC = f−1X JϕKC
JϕKC = ⋂
n<ω
f−nX JϕKC J∀ϕKC = |X| if JϕKC = |X|, else ∅.
Note that valuations of formulas are no longer restricted to open sets. We then have
the following results regarding satisfiability on some standard metric spaces.
Theorem 11.1 ([16]). If ϕ ∈ LC is classicaly satisfiable on any topological space,
then it is classically satisfiable on Q.
Theorem 11.2 ([11]). If ϕ ∈ LC is classicaly satisfiable on an expanding poset, then
it is classically satisfiable on Rn for any n ≥ 2.
Theorem 11.3 ([16]). If ϕ ∈ LC is classicaly satisfiable on any complete metric space,
then it is classically satisfiable on the Cantor space.
Remark 11.4. Ferna´ndez-Duque [16] states Theorem 11.1 for LC, but the proof pro-
vided yields the result for all of LC . Roughly speaking, this is due to the fact that the
simulations constructed in the proof are total and surjective.
Theorem 11.2 is a strengthening of a result of Slavnov [33].
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Our intuitionistic temporal logic may then be interpreted in DTL via the Go¨del-
Tarski translation ·, defined as follows:
Definition 11.5. Given ϕ ∈ L∗, we define ϕ
 ∈ LC recursively by setting
⊥ = ⊥ (ϕ) = ϕ (ϕ⊙ ψ) = ϕ ⊙ ψ
p = p (ϕ) = ϕ (ϕ→ψ) = (ϕ → ψ)
where ⊙ ∈ {∧,∨} and  ∈ {◦,♦, ∀}.
In words, we put in front of variables, implication and. The following can then
be verified by a simple induction on ϕ:
Lemma 11.6. Let ϕ ∈ L∗, and X be any dynamic topological system. Suppose that J·K
is an intuitionistic valuation and J·KC a classical valuation such that, for every atom p,
(JpKC)◦ = JpK. Then, for every formula ϕ, JϕK = qϕyC .
Then we obtain the following.
Theorem 11.7. Given n ≥ 2, ITL0♦ is complete forR
n, as well as for the Cantor space.
Proof. If ϕ is valid on Rn then by Lemma 11.6 ϕ is valid on Rn and hence, by
Corollary 10.11, ϕ (and thusϕ) is valid on the class of expanding posets and therefore
derivable in ITL0♦. Completeness for the Cantor space follows by similar reasoning
using Theorem 11.3.
By similar reasoning, but using Theorems 11.1 and 9.8, we obtain the following.
Theorem 11.8. ITL0♦∀ is complete for Q.
In contrast Example 3.3 shows that ITL0◦ is already incomplete for R. We leave the
problem of axiomatizing ITLR◦ open, along with the long-standing problem of axioma-
tizing DTLR◦ .
12 Concluding remarks
We have provided a sound and complete axiomatization for -free fragments of intu-
itionistic temporal logics interpreted over various classes of dynamical systems. Many
questions remain open in this direction, perhaps most notably an extension to the full
language with. This is likely to be a much more challenging problem than that for ♦,
as we do not even have a feasible set of axioms for Kremer’s interpretation of . On
the other hand, the semantics for  given in [7] does satisfy the standard axioms for 
of classical LTL, but little else is known about it, including its decidability. Aside from
ITL with ‘henceforth’ over the class of all dynamical systems one may consider the
corresponding logics for the class of dynamical posets, for spaces with an open map,
or for persistent posets; none of these logics have been axiomatized, but we know that
they are all distinct [7].
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